Introduction
After many years of bitter armed conflict between the liberation forces and the colonial state, Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980 amid much joyous celebration over what was expected to be the beginning of a new era of racial equality, fairness and constructive and harmonious nation building and general welfare that would serve as a shining example to the rest of the Continent. This seemed more so given the incoming Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's magnanimous statement calling for forgiveness for past wrongs and reconciliation among former enemies. On 17 April, 1980, he had told a very nervous white Zimbabwean population:
If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you. The wrongs of the past now stand forgiven and forgotten . . . I urge you, whether you are White or Black, to join me in a new pledge to forget our grim past, forgive others and forget, join hands in a new amity and together, as Zimbabweans, trample upon racialism, tribalism and regionalism and work hard to reconstruct and rehabilitate our society as we re-invigorate our economic machinery. 1 Yet, hardly two years into independence, the Korean-trained Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwean National Army was wreaking havoc in Matebeleland whose inhabitants were now denounced as anti-government dissidents who had to be crushed at all costs and was killing an estimated 20 000 people in the process. Two decades later, Zimbabwean President Mugabe was equally denouncing white Zimbabweans as enemies of the state who should also be punished and was backing violent farm invasions that drove white farmers and farm labourers off the land. The government was also vilifying Black Zimbabweans who were members of the Movement for This is, obviously, a self-serving over-simplification of the country's past which is meant to legitimize ZANU-PF rule as the logical and rightful successor to Zimbabwe's pre-colonial rulers of what was then, ostensibly, a united Shona nation. The reality is very different. Indeed, just as the Zimbabwean scholar, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, has asked, we may also pose the same pertinent question: Do Zimbabweans Exist?
5 Did they, in fact, ever exist? Or is present-day
Zimbabwe merely a colonial and nationalist construct which is yet to become a nation?
In Ndlovu-Gatsheni's words:
like all historically and socially constructed phenomena [Zimbabwe] is exceedingly difficult to define. It is a complex mosaic of contending histories and memories, making it as much a reality as it is an idea -a construction not only moulded out of pre-colonial, colonial and nationalist pasts, but also out of global values of sovereignty, self determination and territorial integrity. It is an idea born out of continuing synthesis of multilayered, overlapping and cross-pollinating historical genealogies, and contending nationalisms, as well as suppressed local and regional sovereignties.
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The above questions evoke more related questions about what has inhibited the development of a common Zimbabwean identity, a Zimbabwean common sense of nationalism and the construction of a viable, successful and coherent nation state.
In search of answers to these and other questions, this lecture explores the processes of identity making and state building in a multi-ethnic and multi-racial society, recently emerging from a protracted armed struggle against a racially-ordered settler colonial domination. It examines the extent to which historical factors, such as the nature of the state, the prevailing national political economy and regional and international forces and developments have shaped notions of belonging and citizenship over time and affected state building efforts. economy of historical knowledge production in a colonial and post-colonial setting and how this has further complicated the process of the development of a common identity.
The lecture contends that many factors have militated against the development of a common national identity, including, among others, the country's ethnic diversity, the colonial legacy of racism, autocratic intolerance of political dissent, and a racialised unequal socioeconomic regime, the armed conflict that tore the fabric of Zimbabwe's society for almost two decades and left the races divided, the policy of reconciliation after independence, notwithstanding, the vexatious question of land ownership that remained dangerously unresolved for twenty years, and the problematic role of intellectuals, especially historians, in shaping competing perceptions about the country's past and present and fuelling difference rather than a sense of common and shared interests. These issues are briefly discussed below.
The underlying assumption here is that the challenges facing Zimbabwe in its postcolonial nation-building and state formation efforts may not be too dissimilar to those that have faced, are facing, or are likely to face other Southern African countries that are also multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-racial and which also emerged from a contested past of racial domination and armed conflict, such as Mozambique, Angola, Namibia and, indeed, South
Africa.
Organisation
Starting with a loose definition of key terms, the lecture discusses historical challenges facing Zimbabwe's quest for a common national identity and an all-embracing nationalism. It will then, in conclusion, briefly comment on the role of historians and historiography in the shaping of the country's self-perception and their impact on the quest for a national identity. By way of a disclaimer, however, it must be noted that arguing for the need for Zimbabwe to develop a national identity is not necessarily an endorsement of nationalism or the nation state as the best systems of societal organisation, but merely an acknowledgement of the fact that these are, currently, the dominant organizing principles of our world.
A definition of terms
In this lecture, the term 'nation' will be used to refer to "an aggregate of persons, so closely associated with each other by common descent, language or history, as to form a distinct race or people, usually organized as a separate political state and occupying a definite territory", 7 while 'nationalism' refers to devotion and loyalty to one's own nation. In addition, the term 'national identity' is used loosely to refer to what A.D. Smith, in his 1991 book entitled National Identity, has defined as the self-perception of "a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members". 8 As used here, therefore, the term assumes the presence of various common attributes, such as "belief in a common culture, history, kinship, language, religion, territory, founding moment and destiny" 9 and other markers of a shared heritage.
Historical challenges to the development of a national identity in Zimbabwe
It is contended here that, on the basis of the above criteria, Zimbabwe was not yet a nation, but only one in the making, in the pre-colonial period, that this process was interrupted and reconfigured by colonialism, and that the country's task, in the post-colonial era, was to build a nation with a clear national identity. Like most African countries which were essentially colonial creations and the products of Western imperial and African nationalist imagination, Zimbabwe is, in fact, a nation in the process of becoming.
Brian Raftopoulos and I argued this view in the Introduction to our recent book entitled The next immigrants were the whites who colonized the country in 1890. They, too, were not a homogenous group, as colonizing parties and early white settlers were a mixture of people of British and Afrikaans stock, soon to be joined by Poles, Jews, Italians, Greeks and other shades of whiteness that made it equally impossible to speak of a common culture and 'biological and genetic identity' even among whites. Indeed, tensions soon developed in the white community, as settlers of British stock fought hard to ensure that Rhodesia remained a British colony and regarded themselves as being "more white than others". Zimbabwe's racial, cultural, and ethnic complexity becomes more evident.
As if this ethnic and racial diversity was not enough, the Rhodesian and South African economies, based mainly on mining and plantation agriculture, spawned migrant labour systems Rhodesia to take up mining and agricultural jobs that the local Africans shunned as beneath their dignity. At the end of the contracts, many migrant labourers settled in the country with local women and raised families. By the time of independence, therefore, Zimbabwe was a complex mixture of various ethno-linguistic and racial groups and cultures that had to be moulded into one nation.
Colonial rule and its legacy
While European colonialism brought several benefits to the country, its racist policies, which manifested themselves in a variety of ways, did not make for good race relations and the development of a common national identity between whites and the majority African population.
Among the most obvious racist policies were a colour bar legislated by Southern Rhodesian
Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins in his well-known 'two-pyramid policy', which was a milder version of what later became the apartheid policy of separate development in South Africa; a job reservation policy that kept certain jobs and professions exclusively for whites; the petty racial policies that were designed to humiliate Africans at every turn; and the exclusion of Africans from meaningful political and economic participation, reducing them to second-class citizens.
Under colonial rule, there were, in fact, two Rhodesias made up of, to borrow from Mahmood Mamdani, Citizens, (White Rhodesians -politically and economically powerful, and enjoying full rights of citizenship) and Subjects, namely, those derogatively known as the 'Natives', (the African majority who were subject to a special type of jurisprudence known as 'customary law' which was not applicable to the whites). 18 Often, when colonial administrators spoke of Rhodesians, they did not, as a rule, include Africans as full-fledged members of that group; regarding them merely as wards under the whites' paternalist care, often patronizingly referred to as "our Africans".
17 C. van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900 -1933 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1976 What is important for our purposes is that the armed conflict sowed deep seeds of racial hostility that would prove almost impossible to overcome after independence. As Rory Pilossof documented in his recent book, 20 when white farmers came under siege during the farminvasions period of the 2000s, the terms they used to describe Africans in general and those that were invading their farms, in particular, were a disturbing throwback to the racist labels of liberation war period. Similarly, those who were invading white farms sang liberation war songs and chanted liberation war slogans that denounced white people. Thus, deeply embedded in the Zimbabwean psyche is the mutual hostility born of the armed conflict days; something that has militated against any meaningful reconciliation which is a necessary prerequisite for true nationbuilding.
Further complicating the issue were the divisions among the Africans fighting colonial rule, which entrenched ethnic/political tensions rather than promoting unity and cooperation among the African people. While the two Zimbabwean liberation movements were not entirely ethnically based, as each continued to have some leaders from each of the two major ethnic groups, the movements were, however, essentially ethnic based in terms of general membership. Rhodesians grouped in such organisations as the Inter-Racial Association and the Capricorn Society, which was designed to promote cooperation between whites and educated Africans.
Frequenting inter-racial tea parties hosted by white members of these associations, the African elite then strongly believed that the doors of the colonial power structure were opening for them at last and that they would benefit from Cecil John Rhodes' adage of 'equal rights for all civilized men'. This seemed to be the case until they discovered that the type of partnership that the whites had in mind, as stated by the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Godfrey Huggins, was that of 'a rider and a horse'. It was only then that they linked up with the ordinary workers and the masses to lead the nationalist struggle.
Meanwhile, as noted, despite the announcement of reconciliation at independence, the bad blood between whites and Africans had not entirely dissipated. The 'elephant in the room' of post-colonial Zimbabwe, to paraphrase Zimbabwean historian James Muzondidya, was the unresolved question of race. 21 African resentment against the whites arose, in part, from memories of the colonial past but also from the perceived continued economic privileges enjoyed by the white population into the independence period, especially their continued domination of the economy. It was also fed by the tendency of Zimbabwean whites, for a variety of reasons, to withdraw from public political life and to retire into exclusive social spaces, such as private sport clubs with high membership fees and expensive private schools for their children. This was read by some Africans as the white people's refusal to identify with the new nation and evidence of a continuation of the social segregation of yesteryear.
African hostility was particularly fuelled by the persistently skewed land distribution that left a small white farming population with most of the arable land, while Africans remained crowded in the former African Reserves. Radical land reform by the incoming independence government had been forestalled by the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement which ruled that land could only be acquired from white farmers on a willing-buyer-willing-seller basis and that compensation for any acquired land could only be in hard currency. In any case, the independence government had not really pushed the land reform issue for the first two decades, fearing to upset the applecart and ruining the agricultural industry which was the country's proverbial cash cow. Meanwhile, it was charged at the time that, due to corruption and nepotism, acquired land for resettlement did not always go to the needy poor majority but to members of the powerful ruling elite. The programmed default position for many of the post-colonial leaders was, therefore unfortunately, repression and the use of violence when they felt threatened by alternative political imaginations. It seems the lesson had been well learnt that political dissent was best handled by the police, prisons and the security intelligence services rather than through dialogue and negotiation. In fact, the culture of intolerance for political opponents was inherited lock stock and barrel by the new ruling elites and deployed effectively against political opponents.
In his work on post-colonial governments emerging from former liberation movements in Southern Africa, Henning Melber has pointed out the irony of the fact that those who had fought so hard to end colonial injustices tended to exhibit the very negative and repressive characteristics of the systems that they fought so hard to overthrow when they became rulers of In this heated atmosphere, the national project quickly unraveled, as reverse racism against whites peaked, while black-on-black violence was widespread as members of the opposition MDC were targeted by the ZANU-PF militia and some ex-fighters of the liberation war. All this mayhem occurred under the slogan of "Zimbabwe will never be a colony again", since it was charged by the ruling party that the reaction by Western powers of ostracizing their government and imposing travel restrictions on some of them were attempts to re-colonise the country by Britain and its Western allies. Thus, supporters of the ruling party now divided
Zimbabweans into patriots (those in support of government policies and farm invasions) and 'sell-outs', 'traitors' or 'puppets of the West', which included anyone critical of any aspect of ZANU-PF's policies and practices. It was not enough any longer, it seems, for one to have historical and ancestral roots in the country to be a Zimbabwean. Zimbabwean-ness was now determined by political affiliation and allegiance to a particular political standpoint!
The labeling and demonising of political opponents was accompanied by an official rhetoric of pan-African solidarity and revolutionary fervor that sought to revive the strong emotions of the liberation struggle and to present Zimbabwe as a country caught in a life-anddeath struggle for survival against the West's determination to reverse liberation struggle gains. Now, Whites ceased to be fellow citizens of the reconciliation speech days at independence and now became enemies of the state to be crushed. Dual citizenship was outlawed and whites were now required to prove their loyalty to Zimbabwe by denouncing the citizenship of their ancestral home countries, even for those, like the long time anti-colonial fighter Judith Todd and others, who had never claimed citizenship in these countries.
Equally, descendants of Malawian immigrant workers who had been born and lived in the country all their lives, some since the 1920s and 1930s, were now told to go back where they originally came from, even though they knew no other home apart from Zimbabwe. The more extreme Shona nationalists were even denouncing Ndebeles who were critical of ZANU-PF policies as recent newcomers to the country who had no stake in it and should go back to Zululand where they originally came from. Increasingly, therefore, nationalism or national identity became little more than a narrow Shona chauvinistic particularism inspired by rising xenophobic tendencies. To underpin this new conception of Zimbabwe, a new parochial and highly distorted historiography, 'patriotic history' was developed. This will be discussed below. The situation as at the end of 2012 is that Zimbabwe is a very divided country that is characterised by tensions between some Ndebeles and the State, arising from the 1980s
Gukurahundi massacres; between the State and its supporters, on the one hand, and whites, on the other, particularly former white farmers, over the controversial land reform programme that displaced them from the land; and within the African population, in general, over political differences in which ZANU-PF supporters stand antagonistic to opposition movements such as the MDC and other smaller parties with regard to issues of governance and human rights.
Indications are that there may be politically and/or ethnically-inspired divisions within ZANU-
Thus, while all these groups and sub-groups claim to be Zimbabweans; there seems to be At the time, however, Ranger's approach seemed to be a logical response to a colonial historiography that seemed determined to deny Africans any meaningful past. The history of the world for the past five centuries, in so far as it has significance, has been European history . . . It follows that the study of history is and must be Eurocentric. For we can ill afford to amuse ourselves with the unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe.26
Not surprisingly, therefore, colonial Rhodesian historiography paid scant attention to the history of pre-colonial societies. At the same time, an orchestrated campaign was made to deny the Africans any usable past. Considerable energy was expended on denying that there had been any coherent social and political organisation in pre-colonial Zimbabwe and that the imposing stone structures at Great Zimbabwe in Southern Zimbabwe were the product of African enterprise. Colonial historians and commentators insisted that these structures were built by the Arabs, the Phoenicians, the Queen of Sheba, King Solomon, or the Portuguese; anyone else but the indigenous people who were, ostensibly, not sophisticated enough to have constructed such a wonder.
There was even speculation that the stone structures were probably evidence of a white civilization that had existed in the area at some earlier date. majority and effectively wrote them out of history. The danger today, as is becoming evident in Zimbabwe, is that, with the ascendancy of the majority to political power throughout Southern Africa, there may be simply an inversion of the previous dispensation in which history is now used to marginalise the former dominant groups who may well be written out of national histories, in turn.
In view of this real potential danger, it is crucial that, as history teachers, we not only impart the various skills of research, analysis, ordering and prioritization of evidence, argumentation, and effective communication that history as a subject has always provided students, but that we also teach our students to be critical and objective about the past, as well as to empathise with the experiences of other groupings whose historical trajectory may be different from their own. Whether they become professional historians or not, we should equip our graduates with the necessary skills to interrogate the past critically and dispassionately and to produce historical accounts that are as unbiased as possible so as to provide a context in which members of past antagonistic groups can understand each other better and, hopefully, find each other.
They also must be made aware that many cultures and societies have contributed to our countries and world today and that it was not and has never been just a matter of "the West and the Rest"; in which the rest were merely passive recipients of the largesse of the West. Department would be innovative and keep up to date with scholarly trends in the field and always strive to reflect the diversity of South African society.
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I would like to echo his sentiments and to add that, under my watch, the Department will do its utmost to ensure that its students are not only sensitive to the diversity and complexity of their own societies but that they are also made aware of the very rich history and contributions of other societies and cultures across the globe to our world today and of the fact that globalisation is not a new phenomenon but a process that is as old as mankind.
Above all, our graduates must be taught to appreciate what historian Louise White has characterised as the "messiness" of history in that, by their very nature, historical accounts exclude just as much as they include and that "there is no perfect closure to any event". In fact, each historical narrative contains many silences that are part of the very process of its creation.
According to White:
Not everyone is included in historical texts let alone when those texts are joined together to make a narrative of the past. But the very messiness of the lived past, the very untidiness of the closures, means that all that has been omitted has not been erased. The most powerless actors left traces of themselves in contemporary accounts, just as the most powerful actors crafted versions of events that attempted to cover their traces or to leave traces of their reinvented personas . . . [T] here can be "a real competition" between political and historical texts which claim to represent the past . . . Looking at how texts compete, at what they compete over, and what is at stake in their competition, is a way to articulate the relationship between them.
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To put this differently, our students must be taught to appreciate the fact that the version of the hunt from the point of view of the hunted lion is as valuable as the story of the hunter, if the true history of the hunt is to be fully captured. At least they should be conscious of the fact that the account of the hunter is neither the whole nor the only truth about the hunt. Ignoring this fundamental fact in the study of our collective pasts will simply take us down the 'patriotic history' route which, through a selective presentation of the past, seeks to promote narrow selfish agendas and does as much violence to that past as the earlier colonial historiography in which pre-colonial Africa was presented as nothing more than one big void or total 'darkness".
